DANGER forward

1

The Magazine Of The Big Red One, Vietnam



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

FIFTH ARVN DIVISION RECONDOS collect captured enemy weapons after helping to rout communist forces at Loc Ninh on 29 October 1967.

SP4 George Pawlaczyk

McCormick Research Center

Volume Two, Number Two—June 1968

DANGER forward

The Magazine Of The Big Red One, Vietnam

First Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345

COMMAND GROUP
MG Keith L. Ware
Commanding General
BG Emil P. Eschenburg
Assistant Division Commander
BG Orwin C. Talbott
Assistant Division Commander
COL Archie R. Hyle
Chief of Staff

EDITORIAL STAFF
MAJ Leonard B. Phillips
Information Officer
CPT Richard W. Flanagan
Editor
SP5 Layton J. Baker
Assistant Editor

WRITERS
MAJ William E. Daniel Jr.
CO, 17th Mil Hist Det
SP5 Stephen C. Williams

ILLUSTRATOR
SP5 Lester C. Looney



This issue of DANGER FORWARD features what many consider to be the most significant operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division since its arrival in Vietnam—SHENANDOAH II (*Vietnam Battles 23 through 30*); the presentation of the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry; a 10-page pictorial tribute to those who have brought a touch of home to the men of the BIG RED ONE; and one of the most fascinating human interest stories to come out of the war.

Richard W. Flanagan
Editor

CONTENTS

SHENANDOAH II 2

BIG RED ONE units account for 993 enemy killed in 51 days of vicious fighting.

BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 23

The 1/4 Cav is honored for its heroic actions during the BATTLES OF AP TAU O, SROK DONG and MINH THANH ROAD.

A TOUCH OF HOME 26

America's top entertainers provide a vital link with the States and source of morale for Division men.

CHRIS 33

In an unprecedented gesture among divisions in Vietnam, the men of the BIG RED ONE adopt a daughter.

STATISTICS SUMMARY 36

◄ABOUT THE COVER► Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, are air-lifted to defend the Saigon water purification plant during the communists' Tet attacks. Photograph by SP4 Phil LeFrancois.

DANGER FORWARD, an authorized publication of the US Army, provides timely, authoritative information of professional interest on combat operations, revolutionary development programs and combat support procedures of the First Infantry Division, Vietnam. It serves as a means of expression for views of the Commanding General and achieves command information objectives of the Department of the Army and the First Infantry Division. Material of interest to Division members and the Army in general is invited and should be mailed to: Editor, DANGER FORWARD, Information Office, First Infantry Division, APO 96345. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of Department of the Army. The magazine is printed at Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd., Tokyo. The title DANGER FORWARD is copyrighted by the Society of the First Division.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

"RAMRODS" of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, ford a rain-swollen stream in search of the 271st VC Regiment.

121st Signal Battalion

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

BY CPT RICHARD W. FLANAGAN

REGARDLESS OF THE TIME, the place or even the individual people involved, there always will be one combat operation in Vietnam that stands above the rest in terms of unit achievement—the *big* operation—the one veterans, war correspondents and students of military history will remember best. Such an operation is SHENANDOAH II, launched by the First Infantry Division, under the command of Major General John H. Hay, on 29 Sept 1967.

To understand and appreciate the BIG RED ONE's success in this operation, particularly as it applies to the battles around Loc Ninh, one must retrace the plans and preparations of the previous three months which, when combined with the magnificence of execution by the division's commanders, staff officers and men, were to favorably shape the course of events in the Vietnam War.

Operation BILLINGS, conducted in War Zone D, had ended on 26 June 1967, but even before the spring was out, the 1st Inf Div had begun its personnel "turnover-period." At Division level, only the assistant chiefs of staff for personnel (G-1), operations and training (G-3) and logistics (G-4) had any substantial time remaining on their tours in Vietnam. Nearly all other key staff members, including the chief of staff, had already rotated clearing operation extending west from National Highway 13 to the Michelin Rubber Plantation.

No one could have predicted at the time what Phase II would involve, but the events of the summer, seen in retrospect, attest to the scope of preparations, which were of sufficient comprehensiveness to fit every eventuality.

Early in September, General Hay set in motion an elaborate plan for the concentration of psychological operations (PSYOPS) along Highway 13. Area studies had indicated that the major proportion of the population in the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) were concentrated on or near that road and economically concerned with it. Even before the BIG RED ONE commander ordered the highway to be opened, which it has been on a daily basis ever since, PSYOPS leaflets were being dropped by the Division on villages all the way from Lai Thieu to Loc Ninh.

Other plans had been in progress during this time also, principally the permanent removal of Division Headquarters, Danger *Main*, from Di An northward to Lai Khe, home of the 3d Brigade. where, as Danger *Forward*, it had been situated for previous operations. The move was accomplished in September, concurrent with discussions to also displace the 1st Brigade from Phuoc Vinh northward to the An Loc/Quan Loi area.



or would rotate between June and August. In the units the situation was the same, if not more critical. Brigades and battalions were losing their own commanders and staff personnel within a matter of weeks or days of each other.

In the face of these key leadership losses, an intensive training program for new personnel was instituted and subsequently carried out with such success that as autumn approached, the BIG RED ONE's combat readiness was at an unsurpassed peak of professionalism, due in large measure to standardized and enlightened tactical procedures.

One method of achieving this was through the use of Mobile Training Teams composed of combat experienced personnel. They conducted training in infantry tactics and troop leading procedures for 1st Division junior leaders and on principles set forth in the Division's handbook, *Fundamentals of Infantry Tactics*. One example of this training was in the construction of night defensive positions (NDPS), featuring bunkers positioned in depth with full overhead cover, a frontal berm and 45-degree firing ports.

The test of what was learned came with SHENANDOAH II. What is now called Phase I of the operation was conceived as a combined reconnaissance-in-force and road

Division Headquarters never returned to Di An. And before Operation SHENANDOAH II was to terminate, the 1st Bde would relocate to Quan Loi. Thus, the entire Division headquarters and logistical apparatus was astride Highway 13 by 30 October. Supplies in enormous tonnages began to move daily on this road or its tributaries northward from the Long Binh-Saigon complex. The northern terminus of this landline of communications had formerly been Lai Khe, but by midway through the operation it had reached the Cambodian border regions.

The area for Phase I of SHENANDOAH II was chosen as a probable site for enemy troop concentrations, intelligence reports having indicated that elements of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment had recently moved into the area west and southwest of Chon Thanh, known as the Long Nguyen Secret Zone. A document captured on 12 October, consisting of a letter from the Rear Service Office of the 9th VC Division to Headquarters Logistics Group 83, stated, in essence, that the enemy regiment had been forced to move from its position in upper War Zone D, because Logistics Group 81 was unable to provide it with support, primarily food.

In addition to the 271st VC Regt and the 83d Log Group, other enemy units suspected of being in the same general area were the 165th North Vietnamese Army

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

(NVA) Regiment, the Phu Loi Battalion, the C64 Dau Tieng District Company and the C45 Chon Thanh District Platoon. Moreover, there were many reported and confirmed VC installations throughout the area; the terrain of which is generally flat, with relief no greater than 60 meters, and covered with secondary forests and bamboo.

Both the 1st and 3d Brigades were assigned missions for Phase I. The 1st Bde was to clear Highway 240, which runs from Ben Cat, just southwest of Lai Khe, to the Michelin. The 1st Bde, meanwhile, was to search the northern part of its operational area for the 271st VC Regt, the same unit which the Division had encountered and punished in BILLINGS.

The BIG RED ONE's mission was to destroy the 271st and other enemy units in the area and to clear as much jungle within the time frame of the operation as available resources permitted.

THE OPERATION BEGAN QUIETLY, with the enemy seemingly bent on avoiding contact as had been the case over most of the summer. Then on 4 October the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Stauffer of Atlanta, made moderate contact with a reinforced company of the 271st Regt, 8 miles northwest of Lai Khe.

The Reconnaissance Platoon of the "Black Scarves" encountered the VC force barely 300 yards from the battalion's NDP. The enemy was in a semi-circular formation, firing from positions in 100-foot trees and spiderholes dug in the ground.

While reinforcements were being requested, Specialist 4 Paul Charles, McGregor, Tex., a squad leader in the platoon, moved forward to reach the pointman who had been seriously wounded. While exposed to enemy fire, he went back to get a medic for the wounded man. The medic was also wounded shortly after going forward to assist the pointman.

Specialist Charles then moved ahead of the two wounded men and laid down a suppressive base of fire with his M-16 rifle. After running out of ammunition, he spotted an M-60 machinegun 15 meters behind his position. He retrieved the weapon and returned with it and three cans of ammunition.

During the heavy fighting Charles spotted an enemy bunker, crawled toward it and threw six grenades at the fortification, destroying it. Afterwards, realizing that the wounded pointman had not yet been evacuated, he administered first aid to the soldier and moved him to the rear.

Then armed with a 90mm recoilless rifle and four canister rounds, Specialist Charles bolted through a hail of fire into the clearing and obtained five cans of ammunition and another machinegun. Moving into a VC force line, he once again provided covering fire for his comrades. While the unit was re-deploying, he remained to throw hand grenades at the enemy positions before rejoining it.

By this time elements of C Company of the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, had arrived to support the platoon. Meanwhile, sniper fire had prompted Charles to pick up an M-79 grenade launcher and walk back into the woods. Although suffering from wounds in both legs, he continued to fight until all enemy fire had ceased.

For his heroic actions, Specialist Charles was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by President Lyndon B. Johnson in ceremonies at Cam Ranh Bay on 23 December.

At 0830 hours, less than an hour after the first shots were fired, US Air Force jets were dropping bombs and strafing the sniper-infested trees with 20mm cannon fire. Twelve enemy bodies were found and the Division soldiers returned to their NDP, as helicopter gunships, jet fighters

UPI Telephoto



PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON awards Distinguished Service Crosses to soldiers at Cam Ranh Bay on 23 December 1967. Specialist 4 Paul Charles of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, is fourth from the left.

and artillery continued to pound the area. US casualties were three killed and 27 wounded.

In reaction to contact, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry(-), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Cavazos, Columbia, S.C., was air-lifted into positions 1½ miles west of this point to block the enemy's escape. During the lift 19 Viet Cong were spotted in an open area; airstrikes were called in and the jets killed all 19. Moments later, 11 more guerillas were also caught in the open and killed by the gunships of the 173d Assault Helicopter Company. Within two days, after the battalion, minus B Company, had conducted a reconnaissance-in-force mission without incident, the BATTLE OF DA YEU would erupt.

Vietnam Battles—23

Da Yeu

AT 1500 HOURS on 6 October the "Swamp Rats" received five 60mm mortar rounds in their NDP. The perimeter consisted of B Company in the north from 7 o'clock to 1 o'clock, C Company in the east from 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock and D Company in the west from 5 o'clock to 9 o'clock. The NDP was in a natural clearing with the

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

SSG Gerard Forken

THE "DOGFACE" NDP was the scene of vicious fighting wherein 59 Viet Cong were killed on 6 October 1967.

SSG Gerard Forken

"SWAMP RATS" from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, prepare night defensive positions near Da Yeu.

treeline about 20 meters from the northern sector and 75 to 100 meters from the other sectors.

In addition to establishing listening posts (LPs), each company sent out an ambush patrol: B Company about ½ mile north of the NDP; C Company about 300 meters further north; and D Company near a loose surface road about ½ mile south of the NDP. It was now 1800 hours and raining heavily.

At 1855 hours as the B Company ambush patrol was moving into position, its pointman sighted several Viet Cong. He opened fire on the communists and in the firefight that ensued, five of them were killed. However, it was apparent from the volume of return fire that the enemy force was larger than platoon-size. Faced with heavy small arms and machinegun fire, the patrol maneuvered its way back to the NDP.

At 1914 hours the NDP came under a 30-minute mortar attack consisting of 150 to 200 rounds.

At 1952 hours the B Company sector began receiving automatic weapons fire from a company-size enemy element northwest of the NDP. As the fire was being returned, Colonel Cavazos called for support from one 105mm artillery battery. Airstrikes and gunship support were not available because of the poor weather, but at 2020 hours a C-47 "Spooky" aircraft was on station providing continuous illumination of the area around the perimeter.

Although unable to fire during the initial period of fighting because of wet powder, the battalion's three 81mm mortar platoons, nonetheless, expended over 1,200 rounds during the night, playing an important part in the overall firepower scheme.

Meanwhile, the C Company ambush patrol observed a large number of Viet Cong in its area and detonated a claymore mine against the enemy force. In the firefight that followed, several members of the patrol were wounded. Sergeant Kenneth L. White, the patrol leader, immediately deployed his men and directed devastating return fire into the Viet Cong. He then moved to a forward position and provided suppressive covering fire, which enabled a medical aidman to reach the casualties and give them medical treatment. Still ignoring the enemy fire, Sergeant White proceeded to crawl directly into the VC kill zone and drag three more wounded men to cover. After insuring that they also were receiving medical attention, he moved up to his forward element and ordered them to withdraw to a secondary perimeter, while he himself remained behind to personally adjust mortar fire onto the communist emplacements. For such courage, which undoubtedly saved the lives of his comrades, Sergeant White was awarded the Silver Star Medal.

The patrol then returned to the NDP, closing into the perimeter at 2130 hours, just as an estimated enemy company was attacking the C Company sector with automatic weapons. In response to the attack, Colonel Cavazos ordered fire on the east from a second supporting 105mm artillery battery, while the first battery continued to fire on the Viet Cong in the northwest sector. This second ground attack was stopped after 20 minutes.

At 2020 hours the Viet Cong mounted still another company-size attack—this time from the west in the D Company sector. When the attack began, D Company's ambush patrol was ordered to return from its position south of the NDP. Fire from a third artillery battery was then delivered on the attacking force to the west.

The Viet Cong stayed within the treeline during their attacks and were not visible except when they ignited

Key to Map Symbols Appears on Page 40



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

trip flares that the 1st Bn, 18th Inf, had planted among the trees. Claymores either in the trees or in the clearing near the treeline were detonated by the BIG RED ONE infantrymen from their bunkers. Many of the mines were replaced by men who crawled outside the perimeter during lulls in the fighting.

At 2317 hours a barrage of 60 to 70 82mm mortar rounds rained upon the NDP, followed immediately by a ground attack on D Company from the south. This final attack was the heaviest and, for the first time, the Viet Cong could be seen moving out of the treeline. At times the enemy soldiers were able to advance to within 10 meters of the "Dogface" bunkers, but a heavy volume of fire and close-in artillery support forced them to retreat and break contact at 2345 hours.

The three 105mm batteries supporting the 1/18 Inf were Alpha, 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery (LTC Joseph V. Spitler Jr., Bn Cmdr); Bravo, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery (LTC Arthur D. Wells, Bn Cmdr); and Bravo, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery (LTC Frank E. Serio, Bn Cmdr). Together, they fired over 1,100 rounds. These, along with the big guns of Lieutenant Colonel Ambrose A. Szalwinski's 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, helped to completely neutralize the enemy's fire and maneuver plan.

A constant redistribution of ammunition shifted around the perimeter during the battle, for resupply by helicopter as well as medical evacuation was not possible because of the weather. The rain also precluded resupply of the three supporting artillery batteries; therefore, no area outside the perimeter was fired into by either the ground forces or the artillery except during an actual attack.

A sweep of the area the following morning turned up 24 enemy bodies and numerous documents, but no unit identification could be made from them. However, information from a NVA soldier who rallied on 27 October indicated that elements of the 271st Regt's 2d Battalion had launched the attack on the 1/18 Inf, supported by its 82mm mortar company, C16. According to the rallier, who remained in the enemy basecamp during the attack, his unit lost 59 killed and 67 wounded in the BATTLE OF DA YEU in addition to 20 killed by a B-52 strike on 14 October. US losses for the action amounted to two killed and eight wounded.

FOUR DAYS LATER, on 11 October, the 1/18 Inf departed its NDP and headed north on a battalion-size patrol into the south Chon Thanh Sector of Binh Long Province. It was a single column consisting of B Company, the command group(-) and C Company.

At about 0945 hours, after having moved approximately 1,600 meters, B Company reported heavy movement in front of the column. The company's 1st Platoon, which was leading, deployed and reconnoitered the area by fire. Immediately, heavy fire was received in return, prompting the decision to withdraw and call in artillery support.

At 1010 hours, as artillery fire came closer, the 1st Platoon withdrew through the 2d Platoon behind it, then through the 3d Platoon into C Company, which had formed a perimeter around the battalion command post (CP). In the meantime, the 2d Platoon reported heavy movement on its west (left) flank. The Viet Cong were apparently using hugging tactics in an attempt to escape the artillery, while, at the same time, setting themselves up for an attack on the center of the column.

By 1020 hours the 2d Platoon had moved through the 3d Platoon and taken a sector of the C Company peri-

SSG Gerard Forken

RESUPPLY is accomplished by CH-47 Chinook helicopter at the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, NDP.

SSG Gerard Forken

BIG RED ONE STRATEGY is mapped out by (from left) Lieutenant Colonel William G. Benedict, division G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Cavazos, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, commander; Brigadier General William S. Coleman, assistant division commander; and Major James M. Tucker, battalion S-3.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

CWO James Colquitt

ROCKETS FIRING on VC troops frightened them into making a futile "human wave" assault on the "Swamp Rats" during the 11 October action.

meter. The 3d Platoon, meanwhile, was ready to pull back and fill in the gap left in the perimeter immediately to the south; however, the enemy had continued to move south on the left flank ahead of the artillery and was immediately west of the platoon when the first light fireteam on station expended at 1020 hours.

As the first gunship fired its rockets west of the 3d Platoon, approximately 75 Viet Cong were either frightened or forced by the rockets into making a "human wave" assault on the battalion. The assault, although concentrated against the 3d Platoon, was ill-timed, for the men of the platoon were already deployed in good fighting positions behind anthills and trees. After 20 minutes, during which 10 of their number had been killed by the platoon's left flank machinegun alone, the Viet Cong withdrew.

The platoon then pulled back into the battalion perimeter, while artillery came in even closer, followed by Tactical Air from the north. B Battery, 2d Bn, 33d Arty, and B Battery, 6th Bn, 15th Arty, pounded the area for two hours, after which the 1/18 Inf(-) moved north again on a sweep, finding 21 VC bodies. A diary removed from one of them established the enemy unit as once more being the 2d Bn, 271st VC Regt. US casualties were one killed and four wounded.

Vietnam Battles—24

Ong Thanh

THE NEXT BIG CONTACT with the 271st occurred on 17 October in the BATTLE OF ONG THANH, some 12 miles northeast of Lai Khe. Here, in an area of heavy brush and jungle, A and D Companies of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, fought a violent meeting engagement with a reinforced battalion of the enemy regiment. But the battle was not won without a price, for the BIG RED ONE lost two of its foremost leaders—Lieutenant Colonel Terry D. Allen Jr., the battalion commander, whose father had commanded the 1st Division in World War II; and Major Donald W. Holleder, the 1st Bde S-3, a former All-American football player at West Point.

On 8 October the 2d Bn, 28th Inf, which had been in the Lai Khe basecamp as the Division's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), air-assaulted into a landing zone (LZ) about 1½ miles southeast of the eventual battle site. The battalion(-), including nine members of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Provincial reconnaissance unit and a US advisor, set up a NDP about ½ mile north of the LZ. During the next six days, the battalion made only sporadic contact, killing four enemy.

On 14 October the "Black Lions" relocated their NDP in an area about 2 miles northwest and then moved again on 15 October to an area about ½ mile south of the previous day's position. Their location was approximately 400 yards south of the confluence of two small streams, the Ba Gia from the north and the Ong Thanh from the southeast, on the edge of the jungle which stretches on to the south.

On 15 October B Company, 2/28 Inf, located a basecamp in the general area where the 17 October battle would take place. While in this location the company received automatic weapons fire from an estimated three Viet Cong, but the enemy quickly dispersed.

The next day, 16 October, the battalion(-), with D Company leading followed by the command group and A Company, conducted a search and destroy mission to the southeast of its NDP. At 1220 hours D Company received sporadic small arms fire and had one claymore detonated against it. In the brief firefight that followed, 17 Viet Cong were killed, making a total of 167 to date in the operation. Contact was then broken at 1305 hours. Fifty minutes later two more Viet Cong were spotted west of the area and were taken under fire by the company. When the enemy force increased to 60, airstrikes were called in and continued to pound the area until 1636 hours. At 1700 hours the battalion returned to its NDP.

As a result of these contacts and a B-52 strike which had been placed in the area during the night, the 2/28 Inf planned to search southward the following morning with a two-company force composed of A and D Companies. B Company was to remain at the NDP for security reasons as well as the mortar platoons, while the Recon Platoon was to screen the area to the southwest.

At 0802 hours on 17 October, the battalion(-) departed on a 180-degree sweep out from the NDP, with A Company in the lead and D Company following. The command group was located in the center file of the 2d Platoon of D Company. Every 100 meters the column stopped to extend cloverleaf patrols 50 to 75 yards to the flanks. Airstrikes were employed parallel to the column 1,000 yards to the east in the areas of the previous day's contact.

The column continued without contact until 0956 hours when the A Company point element discovered a well-traveled northwest-southeast trail, which appeared to have been used within the hour. Fresh sandal prints led in both directions and there were freshly cut trees in the vicinity.

Cloverleaf patrols were immediately dispatched to the east and west of the trail. On the west the patrol had not moved more than 75 yards before it detected movement, investigated and reported one Viet Cong on the trail walking westerly and then a group of six or seven. The A Company commander, Captain James D. George, ordered the patrol to set up a hasty ambush and relayed his decision to Colonel Allen who concurred; however, the ambush did not materialize. Meanwhile, the remaining elements in the column positioned their flank security at a greater distance.

Ten to 15 minutes later the 1st Platoon leader reported movement in the trees and sounds of clicking rifle bolts and rattling ammunition. Captain George ordered the platoon leader to reinforce the ambush patrol and soon afterwards, enemy small arms and machinegun fire commenced from a concealed log and earth bunker, killing one and wounding two.

Meanwhile, the VC volume of fire from carbines, AK-47s and machineguns increased and was coming from

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

JUST HOURS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF ONG THANH erupted, this picture was taken by Specialist 5 Verland A. Gilbertson, 121st Signal Battalion, who was himself mortally wounded in the action. Shown are (starting third from left) Colonel George E. Newman, 1st Brigade commander; Lieutenant Colonel Terry D. Allen, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, commander; Major Donald W. Holleder, brigade S-3; Brigadier General William S. Coleman, assistant division commander; and First Lieutenant Albert C. Welch, D Company commander.

trees as well as ground positions. Within five minutes after the firefight began, artillery was brought in on the enemy troops, who sought to avoid the deadly shrapnel by hugging close to the US positions. Throughout the battle the Viet Cong were to be pounded by 47 US Air Force sorties and nearly 6,000 howitzer rounds from B and C Batteries, 2/33 Arty; B Battery, 6/15 Arty; A Battery, 1/5 Arty; and A Battery, 8/6 Arty.

The 2d Platoon then deployed on line to the right of the 1st Platoon. Unable to communicate with the two platoons, Captain George moved his element to the juncture of them, just 15 yards from the enemy machinegun. After several unsuccessful attempts to knock out the emplacement with grenades and small arms, Colonel Allen ordered the company commander to withdraw through D Company, but the large volume of fire laid down by the Viet Cong hampered the attempt. The firing eventually died down about 1040 hours, allowing some members of A Company, mostly 3d and a few 2d Platoon personnel, to withdraw through D Company.

The largest single body of men, numbering 20 to 25, withdrew with the A Company command group, now under the leadership of First Sergeant Jose B. Valdez, who had taken command from Captain George when the latter was seriously wounded. In order to break contact, Sergeant Valdez organized an assembly area to the east and, as there was no longer radio contact, he fired two or three shots in the air to pinpoint the position. Individuals and groups of two then filtered into the area.

After forming a perimeter, A Company remained in the area about 30 minutes before being forced to move as sporadic enemy small arms fire, including a claymore mine, was received and friendly artillery moved in closer. The company cut west to avoid a marsh and met elements of B Company, which had formed a blocking force and connecting link some 450 yards south of the NDP to assist the wounded.

During the time that A Company was in contact, D Company came under automatic weapons fire from five Viet Cong located in the trees on its right flank. Fire was returned and the enemy snipers quickly eliminated. The company commander, First Lieutenant Albert C. Welch, then shifted his 3d Platoon to a right front direction in reaction to A Company's contact.

Colonel Allen directed his command group to remain in place, adjacent to a prominent anthill, with the 1st and 2d Platoons of D Company. The 3d Platoon was ordered to remain in contact with A Company by extending itself a relatively short distance.

During a lull in the fighting, D Company had received instructions to prepare for A Company's withdrawal through its position. A few men from the 3d Platoon were sent forward to assist the wounded. Firing broke out again on the right flank of A Company's sector and progressed back down the flank toward D Company, where it then broke out from the left and left front, steadily increasing. By this time a few A Company personnel had come into the D Company position, with more expected.

During the first few minutes after the firing had broken out, some of the D Company soldiers in the forwardmost position became immediate casualties. First Sergeant Clarence A. Barrow, realizing the seriousness of their plight, ran through the hail of incoming fire and began moving them to a medical evacuation point. He then moved among the remainder of his men, regrouping them into an effective defensive perimeter. While running across an open area, Sergeant Barrow was wounded in the back. Barely able to walk, he, nonetheless, continued to fire and direct his men. Even after he was wounded a second time, Sergeant Barrow persisted in his efforts to drive off the attacking enemy. He was later awarded the Silver Star Medal for his valor.

The 1st and 2d Platoons of D Company, although suffering moderate casualties were still holding when the

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives



DANGER forward Battle Map

22	DA YEU 6 Oct 1967	P4
24	ONG THANH 17 Oct 1967	P7
25	SROK SILAMLITE I 29 Oct 1967	P12
26	SROK SILAMLITE II 30 Oct 1967	P13
27	LOC NINH AIRSTRIP 31 Oct 1967	P14
28	SROK SILAMLITE III 2 Nov 1967	P15
29	BU NHO RUNG 3 Nov 1967	P17
30	SROK RUNG 7 Nov 1967	P18

DIVISION INFORMATION OFFICE (PIO)
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, APO SF 96345

DISTANCE IN MILES
0 5 10 20

ROADS NATIONAL SECONDARY INTERNATL
BOUNDARY (INTERNATIONAL)
AERODROMES (MIL OR CIVIL)
WOODLAND
RUBBER TREES
RICE PADDIES/WASTELAND
SWAMP/MARSH

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives



Key to Map Symbols Appears on Page 40

order to withdraw was passed. The 3d Platoon had fewer casualties at this point, but the move back through the command group sector with the wounded was slow and difficult.

Although wounded himself about two hours earlier, Colonel Allen remained next to the anthill throughout the encounter, calmly directing the units to the rear until he was killed at approximately 1220 hours.

Ten minutes later Colonel George E. Newman, the 1st Bde commander, arrived at the NDP and assumed command of the battalion, committing the Recon Platoon initially to screen the eastern side of the draw.

Major Holleder also arrived on the scene and, of his own volition, organized a small party of three or four men to help bring back the wounded. The major led, going at almost a dead run through tall grass and knee-deep water. He had out-distanced the rest of the group by 50 yards in the narrow draw when shots sounding like those of an AK-47 rang out, mortally wounding him.

At 1400 hours, C Company, 2/28 Inf, was airlifted from Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) *Caisson V* to the NDP. The company was then committed to the draw and the Recon Platoon was released and ordered to screen to the front as B Company moved into the battle area.

By 1430 hours the firing had ceased and the Recon Platoon rapidly moved into the area of the anthill, followed by B Company. Brigadier General William S. Coleman, assistant division commander, spotted a small opening in the deadfall where a helicopter could pick up the wounded, but only one man at a time. Chain saws were then dropped into the area to clear a pickup zone (PZ) for more rapid evacuation. The last wounded man was extracted at 1730 hours and artillery fire called in on the area. D Company, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, (LTC Calvert P. Benedict, Bn Cmdr), air-lifted from Lai Khe and reinforced the 2/28 Inf NDP in mid-afternoon.

The following morning the battlefield was cleared of the dead. The BATTLE OF ONG THANH had cost the 271st VC Regt 163 men by body count, many of them victims of deadly artillery fire and airstrikes. US losses were 53 killed and 58 wounded.

ALMOST TWO WEEKS ELAPSED after the BATTLE OF ONG THANH without any significant contact with the enemy. Then, shortly after midnight on 29 October, the sub-sector (District) headquarters and the Special Forces/Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) compounds at Loc Ninh began receiving heavy mortar fire, which was the beginning of one of the greatest battles of the Vietnam War. Less than an hour later, reports started filtering into the Division's tactical operations center (DTOC) that elements of the 273d VC Regiment were massing for a ground attack against these remote outposts, 40 miles north of Lai Khe. By 0300 hours, the defenders had succeeded in repulsing this first assault. Phase II of Operation SHENANDOAH II had begun.

The enemy regiment, reforming for another large ground attack, then began firing RPGs into the headquarters compound. Minutes later, at 0515 hours, the attackers again hurled themselves at the compound's bunker-lined perimeter, this time partially overrunning one section and entering the compound itself.

SP5 Wannie Davis

US AIR FORCE JETS flew 47 sorties in support of the fighting 12 miles northwest of Lai Khe.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

ENROUTE TO LOC NINH within hours after the communists launched their attacks were 100 Recondos from the 5th ARVN Division.

RECOILLESS RIFLE TEAMS headed by Lieutenant Jerry W. Hazelwood of C Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, blast away at enemy-held bunkers along the embattled compound's perimeter.

A FIFTH ARVN DIVISION RECONDO moves to a new position as an American advisor checks for enemy activity in the village of Loc Ninh.

DEAD AIM is taken by a Special Forces soldier on the fleeing remnants of the 273d VC Regiment.

Within hours after the attack, the 5th Recondo Company of the 5th ARVN Division landed at the south end of the mortar and rocket-pocked Loc Ninh airstrip and began moving north toward the embattled compound. The task assigned to the Recondos and Special Forces/CIDG soldiers was to retake that small portion of the compound held by the Viet Cong. The job was complicated by civilian dependents who were being held as hostages by the enemy in bunkers and houses in the line of fire.

Scratching a quick battle plan in the red dust near the compound's gates, Vietnamese and American officers agreed on a two-prong attack. In the northern sector of the compound two platoons of Recondos, commanded by a Vietnamese captain, coordinated their attack with one in the south by the remaining two platoons of the company, led by Special Forces advisors.

Photographs by SP4 George Pawlaczyk

In the meantime, C Company of the 2/28 Inf and A Battery, 6/15 Arty, had also been flown to the scene and were setting up a FSPB at the south end of the airstrip's runway. Two platoons of "Black Lions" then joined elements of the 5th Recondo Company for the counterattack on the compound.

Entrenched in the bunkers along the compound's perimeter, the Viet Cong commanded nearly all fields of fire. However, the allies steadily pushed across the debris-littered ground, utilizing 90mm recoilless rifle teams to blast apart the bunkers. As the Viet Cong were either killed or ran, civilians appeared. Women with children under one or both arms and old men streamed past the liberators to the safety of waiting evacuation helicopters. When the action finally broke off with the enemy fleeing, 92 Viet Cong were found dead inside the perimeter.

After making an analysis of the enemy's attacks against Loc Ninh, General Hay determined that the best possible defense of the area could be achieved by placing four NDPs 5 to 6 kilometers out from the beleagured District capital. This placed strategically located US forces at four points of a rough square behind the attacking Viet Cong and compelled them to face in multiple directions.

In order to trap what remained of the battered VC regiment, the general dispatched the 1/18 Inf, later under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Bde, to block enemy escape routes. The battalion air-assaulted into a landing zone 2½ miles west of the airstrip and immediately began preparing its NDP on the edge of Loc Ninh's *Plantation des Terres Rouge*.

THE MEN FROM "DAUNTLESS" pour it on VC troops holding out on the other side of the berm.

SPECIAL FORCES SOLDIERS race to cut off VC elements during the first day's fighting at Loc Ninh.

HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHTING was commonplace at Loc Ninh, as allied forces steadily pushed through compound, alleviating VC pockets of resistance.

ON THE ALERT for signs of the enemy near the village is this soldier from the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry.

Vietnam Battles—25

Srok Silamlite I

SHORTLY PRIOR TO NOON, an urgent request for assistance came from a Special Forces/CIDG element in contact with a platoon from the 165th NVA Regt about ½ mile north of the 1/18 Inf position. In response to this request, C Company was dispatched at 1200 hours.

Moving north through the rubber trees, the company made contact with the North Vietnamese approximately 600 meters from its NDP. The enemy troops were inside the north edge of the rubber in a trench oriented to the north against the CIDG company, which was in the open 400 meters further north. There was no firing at the time and C Company's point element was within 20 to 30 meters of the enemy before either force saw the other. The 1st Platoon immediately engaged the NVA unit with squads advancing in the bounding overwatch method and overran the enemy position, killing nine.

Information from the CIDG company indicated that additional enemy troops were on the northern edge of the rubber. Helicopter light fireteams and artillery were called in to support, while the 1/18 Inf's Recon Platoon was dispatched from the NDP to assist with the wounded.

Meanwhile, the enemy launched a counterattack against C Company from the east with an estimated two-platoon force. Silver Star winner Captain William M. Annan of Baltimore, the C Company commander, moved his 3d Platoon from the west flank to the east and met the counterattack with two platoons on line. Colonel Cavazos then committed D Company from the south to the right of C Company toward the enemy's exposed left flank. Artillery supported the firefight, which lasted approximately 15 minutes. At 1305 hours the enemy broke contact.

The CIDG company joined the two "Dogface" companies in sweeping the area to the east for 300 meters behind artillery fire, which was being continually shifted on the fleeing enemy force. The North Vietnamese, retreating into a north-south draw, were subsequently subjected to murderous artillery barrages and airstrikes.

Enemy losses in the BATTLE OF SROK SILAMLITE I were 24 killed. US casualties were one killed and nine wounded.



Key to Map Symbols Appears on Page 40

AIRSTRIKES DEALT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION to North Vietnamese attempting to escape the battlefield at Srok Silamlite I.

Associated Press



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

SP4 George Pawlaczyk

A FORWARD OBSERVER adjusts artillery fire in support of the 29 October battle.



Key to Map Symbols Appears on Page 40

Vietnam Battles—26

Srok Silamlite II

THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 30 October, A Company of the 1/18 Inf made contact with an estimated battalion of the 165th Regt south of the "Dogface" NDP. The enemy battalion was occupying trenchlines atop a sloping piece of terrain called *Hill 203*. The trenches were elongated drainage ditches between rows of rubber trees.

At 1230 hours, as the company moved up the hill, the point element saw an enemy soldier stand up on the finger of the slope and engaged him with small arms fire; immediately, fire was returned by the NVA force and the BATTLE OF SROK SILAMLITE II began.

Instinctively, Captain Karl W. Robinson, the A Company commander, deployed his platoons and when the enemy soldiers tried to rush the 1st Platoon, they were hurled back by an overwhelming volume of fire from the BIG RED ONE infantrymen. Simultaneously, artillery fire was called in on *Hill 203* from A Battery, 6/15 Arty, which responded with 1,600 rounds throughout the afternoon. The NVA force then attempted to envelop A Company's left flank, but the thrust was thrown back by the 3d Platoon.

As soon as the firing erupted, it was heard at the NDP. Colonel Cavazos immediately organized D Company and the CIDG company to reinforce A Company. Within minutes these reinforcements, together with the battalion command group, were moving toward the contact. As D Company approached to within 200 meters of A Company, it made contact with the enemy unit that was attempting to envelop the latter.

Captain Charles Carden, the D Company commander, deployed his 1st and 2d Platoons on line with the 3d Platoon in reserve, while the CIDG company screened the left flank. The artillery fire was heavy on *Hill 203* by this time and it forced the North Vietnamese to move closer to the US forces. A Company withdrew 50 to 100 meters as the artillery was walked down the hill. D Company, meanwhile, had tied in close to A Company. After the two companies had withdrawn a safe distance, the cannonading was shifted back up the hill, after which six airstrikes interspersed with gunship runs worked the enemy trenchlines over for about 2½ hours.

At 1539 hours, after the NVA positions had been "softened up," Colonel Cavazos ordered D Company to assault the hill, using A Company as a pivot and the CIDG company as flank security on the left.

As the BIG RED ONE soldiers moved up the hill, an enemy machinegun in a bunker opened fire. Specialist 4 Ronald L. Campsey, Private First Class John D. Freppon and Private First Class Joseph F. Hayman spotted the emplacement and with their comrades providing covering fire, began to maneuver against it. Nearing the complex, they were taken under fire by the enemy, but succeeded in overrunning it and killing the three North Vietnamese inside, thus enabling the remainder of the company to advance unimpeded. All three men were awarded the Silver Star Medal for their actions during this battle. Seven enemy trenches were overrun, putting the NVA soldiers in full flight to the southwest through a draw.

During the battle the Recon Platoon and elements of the mortar platoons continuously resupplied the engaged units with ammunition, and as the fighting raged, emergency ammunition resupply was brought in by CH-47 Chinook helicopter from Quan Loi.

Enemy losses in SROK SILAMLITE II were 83 killed; whereas, US casualties were only four killed and five wounded.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

121st Signal Battalion

A BATTERY, 6th BATTALION, 15th ARTILLERY, in the foreground, quickly dissolved an enemy attack across the runway of the Loc Ninh airstrip in the early morning hours of 31 October 1967.

Vietnam Battles—27

Loc Ninh Airstrip

AT 0055 HOURS ON 31 OCTOBER, the fire support patrol base at the airstrip and the Special Forces/CIDG camp were again mortared. Three hours later the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 272d VC Regiment attacked, in three waves, across the airstrip, only to be cut down by high explosive rounds fired point-blank up the runway by A Battery, 6/15 Arty, positioned at the south end of it.

The men from "Deadly" utilized one of their 105mm howitzers to fire over 300 rounds in self-illumination. Another tube fired over 500 rounds across the airstrip to break up the attack and the remaining four howitzers fired a total of 700 rounds in a countermortar/rocket program. When the firing subsided, the BATTLE OF LOC NINH AIRSTRIP had claimed the lives of 82 Viet Cong. Light fireteams and 69 USAF sorties accounted for another 44 enemy killed. US casualties were only 10 wounded.

Later, when the attackers tried to scale the walls of the compound, they were pushed back by the highly effective ARVN soldiers manning the perimeter.

THE FIRST DAY OF NOVEMBER saw a slackening in the bitter fighting, as enemy fire, while directed at all friendly positions around Loc Ninh, was only light and sporadic. But at about 0215 hours both the District headquarters and CIDG compound came under a mortar, small arms, machinegun and RPG attack. However, the Viet Cong were unable to mass for a ground attack because of the deadly point-blank fires being directed at them again by A Battery, 6/15 Arty.

During the day the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry (LTC James F. Cochran III, Bn Cmdr), uncovered and destroyed a new enemy basecamp consisting of seven bunkers with overhead cover. The "Black Lions" also killed two of six Viet Cong who had set up an ambush in defense of the camp, not far from the battalion's NDP. In all, 20 enemy were killed in the day's fighting.

Meanwhile, the BIG RED ONE conducted a Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) in the village of Loc Ninh itself, treating 75 patients while the Division Band held a concert in the village square. Twenty cases of blankets and 1,500 pounds of rice were also distributed to Loc Ninh refugees, several thousand of whom had journeyed to An Loc, 13 miles south when the fighting broke out on 29 October.

The following day, 2 November, the communists at-

THE "DEADLY" CANNONEERS fired 578 high explosive rounds point-blank down the runway, killing 82 of the enemy.

Associated Press

tacked Loc Ninh again with rockets and mortars. They then attempted to overrun the perimeter, only to be met head-on and stopped by ARVN and CIDG forces, assisted by gunships, airstrikes and Division Artillery.

Vietnam Battles—28

Srok Silamlite III

AT 0030 HOURS ON 2 NOVEMBER, the 1/18 Inf NDP came under a heavy mortar attack which lasted approximately 20 minutes. Each of the three infantry companies had ambush patrols positioned at strategic points outside the perimeter.

The A Company patrol by the road to the south saw the mortar muzzle flashes 300 yards south of its position and reported the location to battalion, which immediately requested a flareship, gunships and countermortar fire. Five minutes later the same ambush patrol detected heavy enemy movement in the rubber guiding on the road which led north into the NDP. As it was evident that a sizeable VC force was moving up to attack the position, the patrol detonated its claymores and hastily withdrew to the NDP.

The patrol ran into the perimeter yelling "ambush" to warn the occupants of the impending ground attack from the south. Running behind the last man also yelling "ambush" was a Viet Cong, whom the guard at the entrance to the NDP spotted and killed.

The D Company ambush patrol to the east and the C Company ambush patrol to the north also heard heavy movement in their sectors; accordingly, they detonated their claymores and withdrew to the NDP. Within minutes, the Viet Cong attacked the perimeter from three sides—northeast, east and south, with the primary effort being on the south.

A rifleman with D Company, Private First Class Terry



SP4 George Pawlaczyk

PATROLLING through the rubber trees around Loc Ninh, troops of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, discovered 43 additional enemy bodies after the BATTLE OF SROK SILAMLITE III, bringing the final count for the engagement to 263.

L. Courange, was one of many who distinguished himself in this battle. As the VC attack surged forward, PFC Courange remained undaunted, placing heavy and accurate fire on the attackers. After 20 minutes of fighting, the Viet Cong tried to work their way around his position and, in doing so, succeeded in blowing up the bunker next to his with a rocket round. When this happened, he ran through a hail of fire to a more advantageous position to place automatic weapons fire on the enemy approaching the shattered emplacement, driving them away.

He then moved into the bunker and began carrying the wounded to an aerial evacuation point. Afterwards, he returned again to the wreckage of the bunker and, despite the lack of cover, continued to fire at the enemy. For such heroism, PFC Courange was later awarded the Silver Star Medal.

Defensive fires in the southern sector struck a VC flamethrower, turning its operator into a human torch. Another flamethrower operator was eliminated by an M-79 grenade round before his weapon could be operated.

Artillery fire was brought in on the south and the enemy fire slackened. It was then shifted to the east to deal with the heavy fire that was coming from that sector. This shifting pattern continued as the battle progressed back to the south, to the north, then east and, for a third time, to the south.

Gunships were also directed on the main attacking force to the south and they immediately drew heavy machinegun fire from three locations. Twelve 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns were pinpointed and subsequently destroyed by airstrikes, eight of which were flown between 0230 and 0430 hours, resulting in 55 known enemy dead.

This two-hour period was one of the most colorful of the war. From their NDP, the "Swamp Rats" saw the sky alternately illuminated by flares, artillery and mortar shells, rockets and bombs. The downward parabolas of red tracers from the supporting gunships were matched by those curving upward from the enemy's heavy machineguns. And far from ceasing when airstrikes were brought

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam

RRMRC Digital Archives

in, the enemy gunners let go with bursts of fire at the low swooping jets.

By 0330 hours, ground action in the BATTLE OF SROK SILAMLITE III had diminished to sporadic firefights with small groups of Viet Cong trapped between artillery and mortar fire and airstrikes. The enemy finally broke contact at 0415 hours, withdrawing through the rubber to the southeast.

Initial losses for the enemy, later identified as elements of the 273d VC Regt, were 220 killed, but as search and destroy missions continued for the next five days, additional bodies were found in the area until the mounting toll reached 263. US losses in the superb NDP fortification were only one killed and eight wounded.

THROUGHOUT THE DAY the airstrip was kept open by Division engineers and an Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team, allowing several C-130 aircraft to bring in a steady stream of supplies.

The same morning the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, of the 25th Infantry Division, landed at Quan Loi and was placed under the operational control of the 3d Bde. The battalion was then inserted into Fire Support Patrol Bases *Caisson VI* and *VII* near An Loc, replacing the BIG RED ONE's 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, which was moved northwest of Loc Ninh.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, another 25th Division unit, OPCON to the 1st Bde, had flown into Loc Ninh by fixed wing aircraft and was preparing to lift off by rotary wing on an air assault into an LZ about 5 miles northeast of Loc Ninh to establish an NDP. Through the use of unprecedented mobility, there was now a total of five infantry battalions deployed in and around Loc Ninh.

At the same time the 2d of the 12th was lifting off, General Creighton W. Abrams, deputy commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), arrived to confer with General Hay. The fighting in and around Loc Ninh had become a major focal point for allied commanders in Vietnam.

Vietnam Battles—29

Bu Nho Rung

JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT, the morning of 3 November, a man with a flashlight entered the NDP of the 2d Bn, 12th Inf. A sergeant yelled, "Douse that light!" before realizing that a VC squad had inadvertently entered the position. In fact, the 2/12 Inf was astride the eastward avenue of escape for the 9th VC division, which now mounted an attack. Mortars fired from the north preceded a ground attack commencing at 0230 hours from the northeast.

Thus, apparently without prior planning by the Viet Cong, the violent BATTLE OF BU NHO RUNG began. When it ended 2½ hours later, 56 Viet Cong lay dead, as compared to only three US killed and 34 wounded. A flareship, a light fireteam and 1st Division Artillery supported the action.

At 0955 hours an unknown number of Viet Cong, identified as members of the 9th VC Div, opened fire on the NDP, using 150 Montagnard refugees, mostly women, children and old men, as shields. However, the civilians were successfully gathered into the perimeter and the enemy driven off. There were no US casualties. Later that day patrols spotted more Montagnard tribesmen walking west on Highway 14A in large groups.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF BU NHO RUNG, the village of Loc Ninh grew quiet again and its inhabitants poured homeward from An Loc. Nevertheless, the Division remained vigilant and continued to conduct search and destroy missions throughout the area, killing 41 more Viet Cong in scattered actions.

DIVISION ARTILLERY sends another shell screaming into VC positions during the BATTLE OF BU NHO RUNG.

PFC Jon Nelson

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

Vietnam Battles—30

Srok Rung

ON 7 NOVEMBER FIGHTING FLARED ANEW as the 1st Bn, 26th Inf, caught an estimated VC battalion in a sweep 5 miles northeast of Loc Ninh. Called the BATTLE OF SROK RUNG, the action cost the enemy dearly, but the Division lost one of its finest officers, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Stigall, the "Blue Spader" commander, and former G-4.

In response to the attacks on Loc Ninh the 1/26 Inf(-), which was OPCON to the 1st Bde, had air-assaulted into an initial LZ about 3 miles northwest of the District compound. After search and destroy missions in that vicinity, the battalion was again air-lifted on 6 November into an area about 5 miles east-northeast of Loc Ninh, where it established an NDP. Further search and destroy missions were planned for the following morning.

Elements of the 272d Regt were still disposed somewhere east of Loc Ninh and it was highly probable that the 1/26 Inf(-) would make contact with them in the new area.

At 0915 hours on 7 November, the battalion moved out on a search and destroy mission to the east of its NDP. C Company led followed by the command group and D Company(-). The 2d Platoon of D Company, scheduled for a night ambush patrol, remained in the NDP.

Moving northeast, the "Blue Spaders" ran into a village about ½ mile from their NDP where they engaged one Viet Cong with unknown results. They surrounded the village and conducted a sweep of the area; however, nothing was found. Continuing east through the rubber trees for approximately 1 mile, the battalion encountered sniper fire from the trees. The time was 1255 hours.

One of the flank men in the point squad of C Company spotted the sniper and shot him out of the tree. The squad then reconned the area by fire for about five minutes, later moving on to sweep it. The remainder of the 3d Platoon was dispatched to join the point squad in the sweep, but the sniper could not be found and the platoon withdrew toward the column. Meanwhile, Colonel Stigall had called artillery fire into the area to the northeast along the edge of the rubber.

Captain Raymond H. Dobbins of Marietta, Ga., the D Company commander, having monitored the battalion commander's radio transmissions, knew that artillery was being called in to work the area over before the column moved on. Realizing that the column, as such, would remain in its present location for several minutes, he gave the order for 50 per cent of his company to eat. Before his order could be completely disseminated, an estimated VC battalion attacked the column from the southeast. The time was 1305 hours.

The attack began with a barrage of RPG rounds, small arms and automatic weapons fire. As the Viet Cong assaulted from the southeast, additional assaults came from the south and then the east, with just enough time to identify the sequence. At the time, the column had

SILVER STAR WINNER Major Gene H. Lutholtz (right), executive officer of the "Blue Spaders," and his radio operator race toward the BATTLE OF SROK RUNG with a relief force.

SGT Miroslav Vintoniv



RETURNING FIRE are two members of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, during its battle with the 272d VC Regiment on 7 November 1967.



Key to Map Symbols Appears on Page 40

SSG Leonard Breckler

THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS is awarded to Captain Raymond H. Dobbins, D Company commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, by General William C. Westmoreland, commander of US Forces Vietnam, on 15 January 1968.

SP4 Ron Prince

halted as D Company was making the turn north behind C Company. The battalion's configuration was such that it was disposed for immediate deployment and as the attack began, everyone turned in place and flank security was drawn into the main body. The formation initially facing the VC attack covered 750 meters.

The Viet Cong pressed their attack at the juncture formed by the column's turn north. The battalion command group was located within the column at this point and thus subjected to heavy RPG, small arms and automatic weapons fire, which subsequently claimed the lives of Colonel Stigall and five members of his command element.

When the attack began, C Company's 3d Platoon to the north was moving back to the column followed by the point squad. However, about half way back, the point squad was pinned down for approximately 45 minutes before it could rejoin the main body.

In the meantime, both company commanders were wounded, but continued to command their companies. Captain Leonard R. Tavernetti, the C Company commander, was awarded the Silver Star Medal for his actions in the battle, while Captain Dobbins, who had assumed command of the battalion, was presented with the Distinguished Service Cross by General William C. Westmoreland, commander of US Forces Vietnam.

As the battle ensued, Captain Tavernetti moved the machinegun with the 2d Squad of his 3d Platoon from the left (east) to the right (west). By this time about 35 Viet Cong were moving toward the right flank, but Specialist 4 Morris Nolan, the machinegunner, opened up with withering fire that pushed the enemy back. He was later awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" (Valor) device for his actions.

Second Lieutenant John Karl, the platoon leader of the 3d Platoon of D Company, moved his platoon southeasterly about 20 meters and continued to tie in with C Company just as the Viet Cong attacked. As the fighting raged on, the BIG RED ONE units drew in closer together and formed a tightly knit perimeter defense. After 30 to 40 minutes, Captain Dobbins withdrew the battalion to higher ground 100 meters to the northwest in order to bring artillery in closer. The new location was more defensible and afforded the requisite cover for aid stations to be set up.

Artillery fire from A Battery, 6/15 Arty, and B Battery, 2/33 Arty, saturated the area south and hooked around to the east, while a light fireteam, on station within 15 minutes, expended into the edge of the rubber to the east, subsequently covering the evacuation of US wounded. Airstrikes were then put in north of Highway 14. This, together with the infantry's heavy volume of fire, forced the enemy to break contact at 1420 hours.

Later, Lieutenant Karl's platoon secured a pickup zone to the north, across the highway about 200 meters from the battalion's location. The task of moving the wounded to the PZ was time-consuming, as only one helicopter could get in at a time. Major Gene H. Lutholtz, the battalion executive officer, who was in the NDP, took charge of a relief force comprised of A Company, a doc-

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives





DANGER *forward* Battle Map

22	DA YEU 6 Oct 1967	P4
24	ONG THANH 17 Oct 1967	P7
25	SROK SILAMLITE I 29 Oct 1967	P12
26	SROK SILAMLITE II 30 Oct 1967	P13
27	LOC NINH AIRSTRIP 31 Oct 1967	P14
28	SROK SILAMLITE III 2 Nov 1967	P15
29	BU NHO RUNG 3 Nov 1967	P17
30	SROK RUNG 7 Nov 1967	P18

DIVISION INFORMATION OFFICE (PIO)
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, APO SF 96345

DISTANCE IN MILES

0 5 10 20

ROADS NATIONAL SECONDARY INTERNATL

BOUNDARY (INTERNATIONAL)

AERODROMES (MIL OR CIVIL)

WOODLAND

RUBBER TREES

RICE PADDIES/WASTELAND

SWAMP/MARSH

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

SP4 Allan Showalter

ROME PLOWS from the 168th Engineer Battalion cut their way through heavy jungle as part of the road-clearing mission of Operation SHENANDOAH II.

ADJUSTING the carburetor on a refueling pump to insure the proper flow of JP-4 is a member of the B Company, 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion.

1LT M. I. Goldstein

tor and four medics. It was approaching dark by the time the area was cleared and the units assembled for their return to the NDP.

A sweep of the battlefield turned up 66 VC bodies, while another 27 enemy had been killed by air support. US losses were 18 killed and 20 wounded.

NOT ALL OF THE US UNITS in SHENANDOAH II had an opportunity to participate in one of the operation's pitched battles. However, those who did not made other valuable contributions to the overall success that was achieved.

For instance, in the road-clearing mission on Highway 240 from Ben Cat to the Michelin Plantation, the 1st Engineer Battalion (LTC Thorwald R. Peterson, Bn Cmdr), and the 168th Engineer Battalion with the attached 27th Land Clearing Team cleared a swath of jungle averaging 100 yards on each side of the road, thereby eliminating effective VC ambush and possible tax-collection points.

The engineers also improved the roadbed itself, to allow for a better flow of civilian and military traffic, and constructed a landing zone 200 yards wide and 16 miles long for the rapid insertion of men and materiel into the operational area whenever the situation dictated.

Other units such as the Support Command's 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Ingalls, kept the BIG RED ONE's combat troops and units supplied and serviced around-the-clock. During the fighting at Loc Ninh, the men of the 1st S&T Bn issued an average of 42,000 gallons of

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

CPT Richard Dexter



JP-4 gasoline a day—one fifth again as much as that consumed on any given day during Operation JUNCTION CITY—to help give the Division the mobility it needed to rapidly reposition attillery batteries and transport infantry battalions into the battle area.

Also waging its own particular brand of warfare in SHENANDOAH II was the Division's G-5 staff section, through psychological operations and civil affairs. The civil affairs action was focused on the refugee problem existing at An Loc, during the battle for Loc Ninh. The problem reached its peak on 3 November with the arrival of 3,500 refugees, 2,700 of whom were completely dependent on government help. Here, the BIG RED ONE assisted by providing rice, oats, wheat, canned milk and portable latrines. PSYOPS activities took place during most of the operation and centered about leaflet drops and loadspeaker broadcasts. During a six-week period a total of 5,875,000 leaflets were dropped in support of combat operations.

OPERATION SHENANDOAH II TERMINATED ON 19 NOVEMBER, after 51 days which included some of the most vicious fighting any division has engaged in since coming to Vietnam. During this time 1st Inf Div

WHEN FIGHTING BROKE OUT at Loc Ninh, the village's 3,500 inhabitants were evacuated to An Loc, 13 miles south, where civil affairs personnel from the Division G-5 section assisted in the temporary resettlement of them.

CPT Richard Dexter

SP5 Vince Cattera

EXTENSIVE ENEMY BASECAMP COMPLEXES in War Zone C were key targets for massive B-52 strikes.

PFC Ron Thornbrue



HELPING TO EVACUATE some of the 250 tons of rice captured in SHENANDOAH II are two members of the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry.

units involved in the operation accounted for 993 Viet Cong killed by body count—a conservative figure in view of the fact that the bodies of many enemy dead were never found due to the guerilla practice of retrieving them at any cost. Among the strategic results of the operation, especially Loc Ninh, may well have been the crippling of the enemy's capability to fully execute his future plans.

Captured were 70 individual and 30 crew-served weapons, 250 tons of rice, 27 tons of salt, and huge amounts of ammunition, equipment, supplies, documents and clothing. Destroyed were 1,994 bunkers and structures.

The tactical air and artillery used throughout the operation for close support, landing zone preparatory fires and destruction of basecamps played a large role in Division success. A total of 2,234 sorties were flown, more than 2,776 tons of ordnance expended and 23 B-52 strikes conducted. Artillery ammunition consumed amounted to 142,264 rounds. The coordinated use of both types of firepower produced maximum results on the enemy and, in turn, appreciably reduced the number of friendly casualties.

Another reason for success was no doubt the rapid and the multiple deployment of the infantry battalions, and supporting artillery over an area extending from Lai Khe to Loc Ninh, in a manner termed "brilliant" by General Westmoreland.

THE HIGHLIGHT OF SHENANDOAH II was, of course, the battle for Loc Ninh. In retrospect, it may be that during those historic eight days of fighting the Viet Cong were desperate for a victory over allied troops and willing to take enormous losses to achieve it, especially in view of the inauguration and National Day ceremonies being held in Saigon at the same time. It may also be that the VC were willing to pay the exorbitant price they did in order to draw Division forces to the north in preparation for the Tet attacks. If this was their hope, it was founded on a gross misunderstanding of the BIG RED ONE's resourcefulness, professionalism and methods of operation. The securing of Highway 13, far from making the Division roadbound, gave it instead greater flexibility to conduct aerial assaults throughout the TAOI.

On 5 November after a combined total of nearly 1,000 enemy soldiers had been killed at Loc Ninh by US and ARVN units, General Hay escorted the press through the "Dogface" NDP. Before a gathering of 22 correspondents, representing every major news media in Vietnam, he remarked: "The courage and professionalism of the BIG RED ONE soldiers leaves nothing to be desired. They are truly a credit to the Army and the nation." The general also commended the Air Force support, the over-all teamwork which made the Loc Ninh victory possible and the fine work of the ARVN and CIDG soldiers.

Shortly after this General Westmoreland pronounced the victory as one of the greatest of the entire war and sent his congratulations to the men of the Division.

Months later, General Hay reflected that Loc Ninh—one of the greatest battles and most lop-sided victories of the war—was the result of a tremendously professional job on the part of every soldier, staff officer and subordinate commander. "The single fault was that the teamwork and skill of the BIG RED ONE made it look too easy!" ▮

SP5 Duane Morse

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

By Direction Of The President

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

SSG Leonard Breckler

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION is attached to the colors of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, by General William C. Westmoreland, in ceremonies at Phu Loi on 15 January 1968.

THE VIETNAM WAR has produced its share of men who have distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in battle. These men number in the tens of thousands and rightfully take their places along side of America's heroes in past wars. Occasionally, however, an entire unit of such individuals appears and is so honored with the highest award given by our country, the Presidential Unit Citation. One of the few units this distinction belongs to is the First Infantry Division's 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

On 15 January 1968, in ceremonies at Phu Loi, General William C. Westmoreland, commander of US Forces Vietnam, attached, on behalf of the President of the United States, the white and blue streamer to the "Quarterhorse" colors.

The award, representing the unit equivalent of the Distinguished Service Cross, was given to the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav, for its heroic actions during June and July 1966. During that period the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard L. Lewane, fought and won three violent battles along and adjacent to Vietnam's National Highway 13, killing 614 Viet Cong.

These smashing defeats for the enemy occurred on 8 June, 30 June and 5 July in the BATTLES OF AP TAU O, SROK DONG and MINH THANH ROAD. Here, the cavalrymen proved more than a match for anything that Hanoi could send up against them, and the best was sent—the 271st and 272d Main Force Regiments of the Viet Cong's elite 9th Division.

The enemy's battle plan in each case consisted of a carefully laid regimental-size ambush against a road column, the resultant futility of which cost him 105 killed at Ap Tau O, 270 at Srok Dong and 239 at Minh Thanh Road.

Exemplary of the kind of heroism shown by members of the 1/4 Cav was Private First Class Avery G. Smith of Russell Springs, Ky., who fought off repeated attacks from a tank which had received several direct hits during the 8 June fighting. On the fourth direct hit from a mortar round, PFC Smith was killed. He was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

General Westmoreland called the unit's operation in June and July 1966 one of the most professionally conducted he has known. Stated the general, "The results speak for themselves and I can assure you that this squadron has earned the recognition that it has just been given."

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

SP4 John Grove

AP TAU O

SP4 Phil Stitt

MINH THANH ROAD

SROK DONG

121st Signal Battalion



BY MAJ LEN PHILLIPS

A Touch Of Home

THE ENTERTAINMENT OF MILITARY FORCES is not an altogether recent event, except perhaps in our era. Entire Roman legions were entertained by *mimes* whose art had derived from Greek classical theatre. Without the benefit of audio aids of any sort, or any but the most expediently erected stages, the *mimes* could easily entertain crowds of several thousand. Their language, that of gesture, was clear; they could convey grief, evoke laughter, or tell a story. And the audience response was so strong that the *mimes* enjoyed the status of celebrities and were treated as "Very Important People."

The art of the *mimes* faded and centuries passed before new technology made it possible for the spoken word to be transmitted many miles to millions and for visual images to be passed to whole nations through television. Nevertheless, live theatre in its several branches is more in demand than ever. And live troop entertainment, which is one of these branches, has reached a peak of development in Vietnam probably not approached before, at least since the *mimes*.

Perhaps one reason why live entertainment is so in demand in Vietnam is the nature of the war. Since there is no such thing as a "front," neither is there any "rear" in the conventional military sense. The rear has commonly included club shows and commercial entertainment. Today, in such an atmosphere, television sets and recreational opportunities might also flourish. But to many, if not most units in Vietnam, the rear is not a question of distance; it simply doesn't exist. Live entertainment is usually the only entertainment. The further and more protracted troop removal is from an atmosphere of security, the more intense becomes the desire for live entertainment—and the greater the need for a touch of home.

The BIG RED ONE had only been in Vietnam a few months before its first live entertainment arrived. It came in grand style; Bob Hope, Martha Raye, Ann-Margret and Edgar Bergan all brought shows to Di An, Phu Loi, and Phuoc Vinh in late 1965 and early 1966. It was movie star Ann-Margret who set the tone between the men of the BIG RED ONE and the performers who have since entertained them.

Her March 20, 1966, performance at Lai Khe was short; songs alternating with wildly exhausting athletic dance routines in withering heat and humidity. Afterwards she was draped with a series of leis, in the colors of 1st Division units; given an oriental dress embroidered with unit insignias; and presented with a gigantic letter of appreciation, apparently signed by most of the 2,000 soldiers present. There were many more gifts before Ann-Margret came to the microphone, unashamedly in tears, and said, "This is one of the greatest moments of my life—you've made me feel like a princess."

She spent the next hour signing pictures and talking with troops. They would never forget her, and she remembered them. Shortly after her return to the States a huge—2½ by 3½ feet—photograph arrived at Division Headquarters. It was autographed "To the men of the 1st Infantry Division, with my respect and admiration, always," from Ann-Margret.

The entertainment provided to 1st Division troops has since been widely varied, although some established forms have scarcely played here at all. Vocalists, combos, and a blend of the two have appeared with frequency. Allied nations, such as Korea and Australia, have lent us a variety of shows with universal success. "Entertainment" has

Photographs by Division information specialists, 121st Signal Battalion and professional agencies.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

ranged all the way from a lavish spectacle to a single unaccompanied individual.

Any number of musical groups have appeared, with names as far out as their "combo" music—the "Holy Buckets," the "Sinister Soul Set," and "Monday's Children" among them. Another successful variety of entertainment has been provided by vocalists: especially Nancy Sinatra at Lai Khe in February, and Connie Francis at Di An in December 1967. The men wanted the songs which had been best selling records at home, and they weren't disappointed when "These Boots Were Made for Walking," and "Where the Boys Are," were sung by their originators.

The non-musical stage play—"legitimate theater"—does not readily lend itself to the Vietnam situation, and no plays have been given in the 1st Division area. Except for a stage designed and built with accoustical considerations, the unamplified voice can reach only limited numbers. Furthermore, despite our proximity to Saigon, the movement of substantial properties, sets, casts and crews would make most productions logistically unfeasible. But the stage, along with the movies, radio and



BACKSTAGE AT DI AN preparing for the 1965 Bob Hope Christmas Show are Carroll Baker (above) and Jill St. John.



television, has been well represented by the non-singing, non-dancing performers.

Through the entertainment medium which Special Services has dubbed the "hand-shake tour," many soldiers have been able to chat informally with show business celebrities including Henry Fonda, Arthur Godfrey, Glenn Ford, Arthur O'Connell and Raymond Burr. These men were welcome and well-received guests. But it is only symptomatic of well-known troop attitudes that the question they most often asked Fonda was simply, "Where's Jane?;" and that the most popular such tour was the one by all-time movie glamour girl Lana Turner, who limped gorgeously around Phu Loi on a painful broken ankle.

In terms of time spent in Vietnam and total troops entertained, Martha Raye has no equal. She has toured the country repeatedly, extended for a longer stay, and then after a period in the States—such as for her Broadway appearance in "Hello Dolly"—returned. No one has become better known or more loved by the troops.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

IN GRATITUDE for making her feel like a princess, Ann-Margret sent the BIG RED ONE this picture of herself—2½ by 3½ feet—autographed "To the men of the 1st Infantry Division, with my respect and admiration, always."

The form of entertainment which has reached the most soldiers in Vietnam is the peculiarly American musical or variety show, by which large numbers can be entertained simultaneously. In 1967 Dale Robertson gave a show of this type at Phuoc Vinh, Hugh O'Brien presented "Guys and Dolls" in Di An and Martha Raye brought "Hello Dolly" to Phu Loi. The attractive casts of these presentations were sprinkled liberally with girls, among the prettiest of whom was singer Joy Wilkerson, who has since answered thousands of letters personally in long-hand and enclosed welcome pin-up pictures.

Girls have been an indispensible ingredient in the success of the most lavish and looked-forward-to productions in Vietnam, the Christmas shows of Honorary 1st Division Member Bob Hope, dean of all troop entertainers in our era. The first Bob Hope show to play to a BIG RED ONE audience since War II took place at Di An in 1965. He returned to Di An in 1966, and at Lai Khe in 1967 he played to an audience of 8,000.

Given the code name "Operation Holly," Hope's 1967 show was the subject of an affectionate special edition of *The American Traveler*, a feature article in *Danger Forward* and a color slide show with a synchronized sound track. No less than 14 photographers and two sound men were mobilized for these projects, which were intended as a tribute to Bob and other "troupers" who have given their best in Vietnam. But they were also created for the benefit of troops who missed the show because they were on duty in the field or recovering from wounds in hospitals.

This brings us to Chris Noel, star of the Armed Forces Vietnam (AFVN) Radio show, "A Date with Chris," who is the 1st Division's officially adopted daughter and sweetheart. Her show has been a nightly comfort to many thousands, and probably more than any other performer, even Martha Raye, she has reached the soldier in places where visitors rarely go. In two lengthy tours of Vietnam during the holiday seasons of 1966–67 and 1967–68, she insisted on going to the boys in the remotest areas, clad in a mini-skirt and accompanied by a single guitarist. She was greeted everywhere with the "Hi Luv" warmth which has characterized "A Date with Chris."

In the very special way understood only by those who have served—and entertained—in Vietnam, Chris Noel will always be our girl. The relationship is communal, as well as personal; and it is both subtle and strong. As with Ann-Margret, and in keeping with our style, we hope we have won her esteem. And, despite the heat, the dust and the lack of fanfare and facilities which have characterized her visits—we hope that at least, on occasion, we have made her feel like a princess.

VIVACIOUS Ann-Margret captivated 2,000 of her admirers with a sensational one-hour performance at Lai Khe on March 20, 1966.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

JOY WILKERSON accommodates photographers at Phuoc Vinh in 1967. She is currently touring military installations in the United States but hopes to return to Vietnam in the near future.

NANCY SINATRA (right and above) entertains at Lai Khe in the spring of 1967.

FOOTBALL'S PRETTIEST PUNTER appears to be Joey Heatherton as evidenced here during the 1966 Bob Hope Show at Di An.



LEADING THE PARADE for time in Vietnam as an entertainer is Martha Raye. Affectionately known as "Colonel Raye," she has repeatedly traveled throughout the country, extending many of her tours. TROUPERS ALL: Raye, Hope and Johnny Grant meet at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base. In November 1967, Martha brought her Broadway performance of "Hello Dolly" to Phu Loi. DURING DEDICATION CEREMONIES (below) she makes the foundation of the basecamp's new PX seem like the front of Hollywood's Graumann Chinese Theater.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

CONNIE FRANCIS arrives in Di An about 5 p.m., December 13, 1967. Two hours later she walks to the Bob Hope Stage and minutes later is "on" before a crowd of 3,000.

MISS AMERICA OF 1967, Miss Joyce Ann Jayroe (above), sings during a variety show at Lai Khe in the fall of 1967.



Raquel Welch

Barbara McNair

Elaine Dunn

Miss World of 1967

HOLLY 67 CAST: (from left) Phil Crosby, Elaine Dunn, Miss World (Madeleine Hartog Bel), Bob Hope, Barbara McNair, Raquel Welch and Earl Wilson.

chris

By HUGH MULLIGAN

Probably the finest account of what Chris Noel means to GIs in Vietnam, and in particular to the men of the Big Red One, *is to be found in celebrated war correspondent Hugh Mulligan's article on her during a visit to Lai Khe two years ago. The story as it appeared in the December 31st issue of the* Philadelphia Evening Bulletin *is reproduced here.* Ed.

Lai Khe, Vietnam, Dec. 31—(AP)—The tank driver could be pardoned for wandering off the road and almost mowing down a row of rubber trees.

It isn't every day a soldier sees a green-eyed blonde in thigh-high miniskirt and saucy white boots tramping around the perimeter while the howitzers bang away and the assault helicopters roar off to war.

But then every infantry division doesn't have an adopted daughter like Chris Noel. Only the Big Red One—the U. S. 1st Infantry Division—can proudly make that claim, even if it may cost them a tank or a truck or two running amok here and there.

Plans to Return

The sultry voiced disc jockey, who is Armed Forces Radio's all-out answer to Hanoi Hannah. North Vietnam's lady broadcaster, was officially adopted by the 15,000-man division when she was in Vietnam over Christmas Week in ceremonies presided over by Maj. Gen. William E. Depuy, the commanding general.

Since then Chris toured American bases in Korea and the Philippines before heading to Los Angeles via Hawaii. She plans to return to Vietnam early in 1967.

"This is really out of sight," said Chris when she accepted the honor of being adopted by the Big Red One. In the way-out phraseology of the age group that has made her the division's ideal doll, she added: "It's so cool. I'm in love with every one of these guys."

Then Depuy, in the fatherly way that generals have of looking after daughters of the division, immediately whirled her away in his helicopter for his morning tour of the battlefront.

'Duty First'

The miniskirted charmer from West Palm Beach, Fla., promptly set about living up to the Big Red One's famous motto: "No mission too difficult no sacrifice too great: Duty first."

She trooped out to the rifle companies to chat with the boys in the sandbag bunkers.

She danced with the cooks on mess hall tables, playing rock' n' roll records on the little portable phonograph that she carries everywhere.

She pulled the lanyard on a 105-howitzer, after first signing the shell "To Charlie, lots of luck, Chris," and nearly jumped out of her boots when the round went ripping off into an abandoned rubber plantation five miles away.

She dropped in on an orientation lecture for newly arrived replacements and left the orientation officer to resume his talk with a stammered, "Men, as I was saying about booby traps—"

Talks With Wounded

She spent long hours at the hospitals and aid stations, talking with the wounded, autographing their casts and bandages, always inquiring first with a smile of wide-eyed innocence: "Do you mind if I sign it: "With Love?"

She slithered into a bathing suit for a dip in the 3d Brigade's pool at Lai Khe, hardly batting her long eyelashes at the sergeant's drawled assurance: "Ma'am, we think we got all the leeches and the snakes out today."

Probably no show business personality has made such an impact on the troops in so short a time. Part of this is due to the skill with which she handles "A Date with Chris," her hour-long disc jockey show already heard on more than 300 GI stations around the world. A large part of it is due to her own unique blend of warmth and sex.

Her kittenish costume suggests a go-go girl out for kicks in a square world, but her husky voice, slightly breathless with excitement, communicates moonlight on the back porch, chocolate sundaes at the corner drugstore and the girls they left behind.

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

STATISTICS SUMMARY

BATTLES	UNITS INVOLVED	US COMMANDERS	ENEMY KIA*
Da Yeu (6 Oct 1967) *Story on Page 4*	US: 1/18 Inf(-) A Btry, 1/5 Arty B Btry, 2/33 Arty B Btry, 6/15 Arty A Btry, 8/6 Arty VC: 2d Bn, 271st Regt	1/18 Inf —LTC Richard E. Cavazos 1/5 Arty —LTC Joseph V. Spitler Jr. 2/33 Arty —LTC Arthur D. Wells 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 8/6 Arty —LTC Ambrose A. Szalwinski	59
Ong Thanh (17 Oct 1967) *Story on Page 7*	US: 2/28 Inf(-) B & C Btry, 2/33 Arty B Btry, 6/15 Arty A Btry, 1/5 Arty A Btry, 8/6 Arty 1st Avn Bn VC: reinforced battalion of 271st Regt	2/28 Inf —LTC Terry D. Allen Jr. 2/33 Arty —LTC Arthur D. Wells 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 1/5 Arty —LTC Joseph V. Spitler Jr. 8/6 Arty —LTC Ambrose A. Szalwinski 1st Avn Bn—LTC Paul B. Malone III	163
Srok Silamlite I (29 Oct 1967) *Story on Page 12*	US: 1/18 Inf A Btry, 6/15 Arty 1st Avn Bn CIDG Company NVA: elements of 165th NVA Regt	1/18 Inf —LTC Richard E. Cavazos 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 1st Avn Bn—LTC Eugene N. Jones	24
Srok Silamlite II (30 Oct 1967) *Story on Page 13*	US: 1/18 Inf(-) A Btry, 6/15 Arty 1st Avn Bn CIDG Company NVA: one battalion of 165th NVA Regt	1/18 Inf —LTC Richard E. Cavazos 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 1st Avn Bn—LTC Eugene N. Jones	83
Loc Ninh Airstrip (31 Oct 1967) *Story on Page 14*	US: C Co, 2/28 Inf A Btry, 6/15 Arty 1st Avn Bn 5th ARVN Recondos Loc Ninh Popular Forces CIDG Company VC: 1st & 2d Bn, 272d Regt	2/28 Inf —MAJ Louis Menetrey 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 1st Avn Bn—LTC Eugene N. Jones	82
Srok Silamlite III (2 Nov 1967) *Story on Page 15*	US: 1/18 Inf A Btry, 6/15 Arty 1st Avn Bn VC: elements of 273d Regt	1/18 Inf —LTC Richard E. Cavazos 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 1st Avn Bn—LTC Eugene N. Jones	263
Bu Nho Rung (3 Nov 1967) *Story on Page 17*	US: 2/12 Inf (OPCON) Div Arty VC: elements of 9th Div	Div Arty —COL Henry J. Schroeder Jr.	56
Srok Rung (7 Nov 1967) *Story on Page 18*	US: 1/26 Inf(-) A Btry, 6/15 Arty B Btry, 2/33 Arty 1st Avn Bn VC: 3d Bn, 272d Regt	1/26 Inf —LTC Arthur D. Stigall 6/15 Arty —LTC Frank E. Serio 2/33 Arty —LTC Arthur D. Wells 1st Avn Bn—LTC Eugene N. Jones	66 *KIA — *Killed in Action*

Map Symbols



Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

A RECOILLESS RIFLE TEAM from the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, moves into Loc Ninh to destroy enemy-held bunkers on the first day of fighting for the embattled compound.

SP4 George Pawlaczyk

"The response of elements of the 1st Infantry Division to the enemy attack on Loc Ninh on 29 October was an outstanding example of aggressive, timely and effective exploitation of a tactical opportunity presented by the enemy."

General William C. Westmoreland
Commander, US Forces Vietnam

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives

Danger Forward, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pub. Date June 1, 1968, Collection:1st Infantry Division Publications—Vietnam
RRMRC Digital Archives